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1 
Multilevel Constitutionalism:  
Looking Beyond the German Debate 
 
1. Two Conceptions of Multilevel Constitutionalism 
Multilevel constitutionalism has both a narrow and a broad reference. Narrowly, it 
refers to a particular school of thinking about contemporary constitutional develop-
ments centred on the work of the German scholar Ingolf Pernice and his associates. 
This approach emerged in the mid to late 1990s in response to the dominant 
Staatsrecht tradition in German public law and as an alternative way of conceiving of 
constitutional authority in the face of the exponential growth of the supranational 
European Union. It was an approach that sparked significant interest both within 
and beyond the German context, resonating closely with the emerging intellectual 
and political project to endow the EU with a more or less formal constitutional 
status. As the term ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ became more familiar within legal 
academic discourse, however, it no longer remained confined to its original 
problématique, or even to its German and European domicile.. Instead, it gradually 
came to be adopted as a label, or at least as an initial point of reference, for any 
position that maintained that constitutional ideas, institutions, norms and practices 
could apply in settings beyond the state.1 
The main purpose of the present article is to examine this more expansive notion of 
multilevel constitutionalism – or multilevel constitutionalism senso lato. In so doing, 
the article seeks to confront the most basic questions of principle about the present 
                                                        
1 To take but two examples of the diffusion of multilevel constitutionalism, both Jürgen Habermas 
and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann from their quiet different philosophical and normative starting 
points are content to use the label to endorse their in-principle support for transnational 
constitutionalism. See e.g., J. Habermas, “Does the Constitutionalization of International Law Still 
Have a Chance? In The Divided West (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) 115-193; E.U Petersmann, 
“Multilevel Trade Governance in the WTO requires Multilevel Constitutionalism” in C. Joerges and 
E.U. Petersmann (eds) Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation 
(Oxford: Hart,  2006) 5-58. 
Multilevel Constitutionalism 
 
2 
and future of constitutionalism in an age of intense globalization of economic, 
cultural, political and legal circuits of power. First, there is the threshold question: 
can we even conceive of constitutionalism as something that ranges beyond the state 
while remaining relevant at the level of the state, and so as applicable at multiple 
sites of authority simultaneously? Secondly, to the extent that we can, what form 
does the proper constitutional expression of this new “postnational constellation”2 
take? In particular, where lie the outer boundaries of the postnational constitutional 
constellation, and what kind of juridical entities in what kind of relations inter se 
describe its internal structure? 
 Before we pose these broad questions, however, it is necessary to say something 
about multilevel constitutionalism senso stricto, and this for a number of reasons. 
First, the contribution of Pernice and his associates has been influential in its own 
terms, and not simply as the source of a popular label. Secondly, in concentrating on 
the European supranational arena, this body of work has focused upon the domain 
of legal and political development supplying the initial, the most insistent and the 
most sustained contemporary challenge to the idea that constitutionalism should be 
confined to the state. Thirdly, we see in the terms and in the tone of the initial debate 
between the defender and opponents of multilevel constitutionalism much of the 
sense of deep division that has come to characterize the broader debate on the future 
of constitutionalism in the age of globalization. And fourthly, the circumstances 
leading to the coining of the multilevel conceptual currency may well have 
encouraged a certain narrowness of emphasis both in the original choice of 
terminology and its subsequent pattern of deployment, so alerting us to the difficulty 
of capturing under the sign of multilevel constitutionalism all that might profitably 
be said about the postnational constitutional constellation.  
 
 
 
                                                        
2  See J. Habermas, The Postnational Constellation (Cambridge: Polity, 2001)  
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2. The German Debate 
In 1995 Ingolf Pernice proposed the idea of Verfassungsverbund to encapsulate the 
constitutional novelty of the EU.3 In so doing, he drew an explicit contrast between 
his position and that of the German Constitutional Court in its famous Maastricht 
Urteil of 1993.4 In a judgment widely interpreted then and now as a reassertion of the 
sovereign authority of the state and as a warning against any future demonstration 
of the expansionist ambition expressed by the EU in the Treaty of Maastricht, the 
Court chose to characterize the new supranational configuration in more modest 
state-derivative terms, as a Staatenverbund.5 All candidate English renditions of the 
two key terms in the German debate are clumsy and lacking in nuance, and these 
translation problems exacerbate what is already a difficult exercise in concept-
tualization. Whereas Staatenverbund refers, roughly speaking, to a compound of 
states, Vertfassungsverbund seeks to capture the same sense of a composite arrange-
ment, but one whose genetic code is constitutional rather than statal. Yet in replacing 
‘state’ with ‘constitution’ we are not really replacing like with like. Whereas ‘state’ is 
clearly a nominal category, ‘constitution’ is ambiguously poised between the nomi-
nal and the adjectival. It follows that it is unclear whether Verfassungsverbund is better 
translated as a single constitutional compound (or as a composite constitution) or as 
a system of compound (or composite) constitutions. The French translation of the 
German original preferred by Pernice, constitution composée,6 opts for the singular, 
whereas the  term employed by Pernice to disseminate his ideas in the Anglophone 
world – that of ‘multilevel constitutionalism’ itself 7- consolidates the ambiguity by 
                                                        
3  At a conference in Lausanne. See I. Pernice, “Bestandssicherung der Verfassungen: 
Verfassungsrechtliche Mechanismen zur Wahrung der Verfassungsordnung,” in: R. Bieber and P. 
Widmer (eds), The European constitutional area, (1995), 225, 261 et seq.; “ Die Dritte Gewalt im 
europäischen Verfassungsverbund”, (1996) Europarecht  27; “ Europäisches und nationales 
Verfassungsrecht, (2001) 60 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 
163. 
4 BVerfGE89, 155; or Brunner v European Union Treaty [1994] 1CMLR 57. 
5  A term  previously  used in an extra-judicial context by Paul Kirchoff, the judge rapporteur of 
the Maastricht decision. See P. Kirchhof, “Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen 
Integration”, HdbStR Vol. VII, § 183, para. 69. 
6 I. Pernice and F. C. Mayer, ”De la constitution composée de l’Europe,” (2000) Revue Trimestrielle 
de Droit Européen  623. 
7 First at a conference in Bristol, England in 1998.  I. Pernice, “Constitutional Law Implications for 
a State Participating in a Process of Regional Integration. German Constitution and Multilevel 
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focusing  on the abstract quality of constitutionalism rather than on a concrete  consti-
tutional entity or entities  
 This is a doubt, however, that Pernice’s theoretical enterprise can accommodate with 
reasonable comfort. For his deeper message is that once we understand ‘constitution’ 
rather than ‘state’ to be the governing regulatory category, the question of how many 
specific such ‘constitutional’ units or entities there are is of  less moment. Whereas 
‘state’ as a particularizing  category suggests singularity and mutual exclusivity of 
public authority, ‘constitutional’ as a universalizing  category suggest continuity and 
complementarity of public authority. Pernice’s detailed formulations of multilevel 
constitutionalism underline the fuzziness of boundaries by stressing the centrality of 
an interactive process of establishing, organizing, sharing and limiting powers.8  The 
multilevel constitution is citizen-centred – including a strong focus on individual 
rights - rather than polity-centred. Insofar as it does individuate the polities or 
‘levels’ of the overall configuration it does not understand their relations in 
hierarchical terms. Rather, sovereignty is pooled, and at the level both of cultural 
identity and of institutional function and loyalty the relations between the state and 
the supranational platforms are not to be regarded in either/or zero-sum terms, but 
rather as an interlocking, overlapping and positive-sum whole. 
As already intimated, the theory of multilevel constitutionalism senso stricto stands as 
a significant formative influence and background frame for the idea of multilevel 
constitutionalism senso lato. Pernice’s theory has been highly influential, especially in 
the German-speaking academic world, in the development of understandings of the 
constitutional structure of the European juridical space as a complex and inclusive 
unity.9  This influence also has a practical edge. In drawing so heavily on the existing 
                                                                                                                                                               
Constitutionalism,” in: E. Riedel (ed) German Reports on Public Law Presented to the XV. 
International Congress on Comparative Law, Bristol, 26 July to 1 August 1998, 1998, p. 40. See 
also, I. Pernice,” Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam: European 
Constitution-Making Revisited?” (1999) 36 CMLRev. 703-750; “Multilevel Constitutionalism in 
the European Union” (2002) 27 European Law Review 511-529. 
8 See e.g. Pernice, above n7 “Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam “ 703-
729. 
9  For other conceptions of the EU as a complex unity, see e.g. A Von Bogdandy, “The European 
Union as a Supranational Federation: A Conceptual Attempt in the Light of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam” (2000) 6 Columbia Journal of European Law 27-54; D. Curtin and I. Dekker, “The EU as a 
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pattern of interlocking national and supranational public authority in making its 
own particular variant of the constitutional argument, the multilevel constitutionalist 
mindset has contributed to the case for viewing the EU in constitutional terms 
whether or not its constitutional status should ever come to be recognized and 
dignified in the form of a “Big-C”10 documentary constitution.11  Such a generous 
approach to constitutional branding has in turn established a sharp and lasting break 
with the kind of constitutional nationalism reflected in the Staatenverbund approach, 
and in so doing so has supplied a typically stark context of disputation in the 
argument over whether constitutionalism can and should spread beyond the state.12  
Yet if state-centred constitutionalism clearly marks the inner boundary of Pernice’s 
multilevel constitutionalism, its terms and context of application also suggests 
something about its outer limits. To some at least, the idea of ‘levels’ continues to 
imply a notion of hierarchy – of higher and lower – rather than simply one of 
dispersed parts, and this hint of subservience to ‘the higher level’ can reinforce the 
anxiety not only of the defenders of state constitutionalism but of all who are wary of 
conceiving of supranational or transnational constitutionalism in ‘top-down’ regional 
or global terms.13 What is more, the notion of a unity however dispersed and 
complex, evoked by the idea of a single-cloth constitutionalism, speaks to a degree of 
harmony between the state and non-statal parts that may not be endorsed by more 
                                                                                                                                                               
“Layered” International Organisation: Institutional Unity in Disguise” in P. Craig and G de Burca 
(eds) The Evolution of EU Law(Oxford: OUP, 1999); “The Constitutional Structure of the European 
Union: Some Reflections on Vertical Unity-in-Diversity” in P. Beaumont, C. Lyons, and N. Walker 
(eds) Convergence and Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford: Hart, 2002) 59-78. As is made 
quite explicit in the work of Pernice (n7 above), Von Bogdandy and others, the idea of a complex, 
internally differentiated constitutional unity owes much to a historical understanding of 
federalism as a template of decentralized political organisation  possessing a resilient quality of 
internal order without  necessarily being state-based. See, more broadly, O. Beaud Théorie de la 
Fédération, (Paris : Presses Universitaire de France, 2007) : M. Avbelj, « Theory of the European 
Bund » (PhD, European University Institute , Florence, 2009).  
10 See e.g. N Walker “Big “C” or small ‘”c:? “ (2006) 12 ELJ 12-14.  
11 For example, Pernice has recently argued that, notwithstanding the failure of the 2004 
Constitutional Treaty,  the explicitly non-constitutional Treaty of Lisbon that has taken its place 
should be viewed as an example of multilevel  constitutionalism in action. See I. Pernice, “The 
Treaty of Lisbon: Multilevel constitutionalism in action”, (2009) 15(3) Columbia Journal of 
European Law  (forthcoming).  
12  For a historically sensitive overview of the German debate, see  J. Murkens, “The Future of 
Staatsrecht: Dominance, Demise or Demystification?” (2007) 70 MLR 731-758.  
13  On the authoritarian dangers implicit in international or transnational constitutionalism, see 
M. Koskenniemi “The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics” (2007) 
70 Modern Law Review 1, 15-19. 
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“pluralist”14 visions of the relations between different constitutional sites. And 
finally, the focus of the theory of multilevel constitutionalism senso stricto on the 
European Union, which, on the one hand, stands as a kind of advance challenge to 
the constitutional hegemony of the state, but on the other, is relatively ‘state-like’ in 
many of its own constitutional features, leaves it with little to say about those other  
forms of transnational constitutionalism – actual or potential – that lack the 
authoritative scope, institutional intensity and breadth and depth of cultural 
identification of the European regional model.  
 
3. The Wider Debate and the Politics of Constitutional  
    Definition  
For much of the modern age of constitutionalism inaugurated by the French and 
American revolutions the kind of position struck by Ingolf Pernice and his associates 
would simply have been unimaginable. The modern state, understood as the key 
unit within the global framework of authority, was for long the undisputed domicile 
of constitutionalism and the guarantor of its relevance. It was only in the late 20th 
century when the configuration of economic, political and cultural forces that 
produced the state-centred global framework of authority was no longer so securely 
in place that the idea of multilevel constitutionalism senso lato – as concerned with 
the very possibility of constitutionalism beyond the state - could gain any traction in 
Europe or elsewhere. Like “multi-level governance”15, its even better-known sister 
concept in political science, the advent of multilevel constitutionalism is a product 
first and foremost of objective changes in the socio-political world rather than of 
innovation in the world of ideas. Yet for all that it is events-driven, the emergent 
debate over multilevel constitutionalism senso lato has proved to be at once highly 
charged and extremely fragmented. If we begin by investigating why this is the case 
and look at how disagreement and disengagement has tended to manifest itself, this 
                                                        
14  See e.g. , N. Walker, “The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism” (2002) 65 MLR 317 
15  See G. Marks, L. Hooghe and K. Blank,” European Integration since the 1980s: State-Centric 
versus Multi-Level Governance” (1996) 34 Journal of Common Market Studies 343-378.  
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will clear the ground for an examination of what is most fundamentally at stake 
between the proponents and opponents of multilevel constitutionalism.  
An initial survey of the debate over multilevel constitutionalism senso lato reveals an 
exaggerated version of a familiar problem. As is common when we are dealing with 
social and political concepts  that register both at the ‘object’ level of everyday use 
and at the ‘observer’ level of theoretical inquiry, the answers that many analysts seek 
or expect when addressing the prospects of constitutionalism seem often to be 
anticipated in their stipulation of the definitional preliminaries. However, just 
because so much uncertainty surrounds a conceptual leap of such audacious pro-
portions as is contemplated in taking constitutionalism beyond the state, the absence 
of agreement over definitional preliminaries is uncommonly pronounced and conspi-
cuous in the instant case. This fractured beginning, in turn, leads to an unusually 
sharp polarization of theoretical positions.  We are faced, in effect, with an irony of 
overproduction. On the one hand, in academic circles at least, the unsettling of old 
taken-for-granted certainties about the place of constitutionalism within the global 
scheme means that never has discussion of law and politics so frequently, so 
explicitly and so self-consciously occurred within a constitutional register, and never 
has the constitutional idea been so insistently reasserted in its old state setting or so 
vigorously sponsored in new non-state settings. On the other hand, however, just 
because the stakes are so high and the value of the currency so volatile, never has 
discussion of constitutionalism cultivated such little common ground.16 There is scant 
cross-fertilization from the different points of departure, and what exchange does 
take place often appears to be the dialogue of the deaf. 
This is not intended as a partisan point.  Those who want or expect constitutionalism 
to travel to sites and levels of operation beyond its traditional state domicile are as 
likely to load the conceptual dice in favour of their preferred conclusion as those who 
start from the prejudice that no such mobility is possible or desirable. What is more, 
each side tends to encourage the other in its conceptual myopia.  
                                                        
16  See e.g., Walker, n14 above. 
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On the part of the advocates of constitutionalism in multiple sites and contexts 
beyond the state, we encounter a whole series of conceptual starting points that are 
in danger of treating constitutionalism in superficial terms - as too easily detached 
from its statist moorings. This is most evident in the case of what are best described 
as nominal definitions of constitutionalism. Here, constitutionalism is deployed 
merely as an affirmative label for whatever concept, institution or attitude of gover-
nance, wherever situated, that its sponsor endorses or considers pivotal to the regu-
latory regime in question, whether we are talking about human rights protection, 
anti-discrimination measures, or even just a commitment to ‘the Rule of Law’. The 
purpose here is ideological; to give  the feature(s) of governance to which one is 
committed or to which one attributes central significance  the additional gravitas of 
affirmation in a powerful and familiar symbolic register, or to deny such affirmation 
to other approaches that lack the favoured feature(s) or even oppose the priority 
given to them. Implicit in this ideological agenda stands the conviction, or at least the 
unexamined premise, that there is simply nothing that privileges the relationship 
between the state and constitutionalism, and so nothing of special value to be lost in 
the move beyond that relationship. The point of the nominalist position, in sum, is 
precisely not to argue the case for the mobility of the constitutional idea beyond the 
state but, by treating constitutionalism as a floating signifier, to elevate the case to the 
exalted position of the unarguably correct.17 
 A second deracinated version of constitutionalism concentrates on formal features. 
Unlike nominalism, here the state, as the undisputed source of the modern 
constitutional idea, retains some influence over the destination meaning, if much 
                                                        
17  We must be careful not to be too critical of nominalist positions. First, often good arguments 
are made for this or that aspect of governance from within a nominalist position; it is just that 
these arguments are not enhanced by the use of constitutional language. Secondly, often 
nominalism shades into formalism or substantivism (see text below), and indeed formal or 
substantive borrowing from the state tradition may be the inarticulate premise underlying the 
nominalist position. Thirdly, nominalism may connect to the vital ‘placeholding’ function of 
constitutionalism, discussed in Section 5 below, in that through its insistence on a constitutional 
register  it speaks not only to a desire to obtain ideological advantage for ones position, but also 
to an awareness of how much continues to be at  stake in the very idea of a political framing of 
our social arrangements  For just one example of writer who uses the language of transnational 
constitutionalism in this loose but provocative way, see C. Joerges, ‘”Good Governance’ in the 
European Internal Market An Essay in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann” EUI Working Papers, 
RSC 2001/29.    
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attenuated. The formalist approach suggests that the very manner in which – the 
form through which – the political world may be understood and organized from a 
juridical perspective may borrow from or be inspired by the state constitutional 
template. This is most obviously the case with regard to the idea of a constitutive 
juridical instrument, whether or not specifically so-called ‘Constitutional’ (as in the 
case of the abortive EU constitutional text of 2004),18 that is so familiar from state 
public law.  In the context of non-state legal and institutional orders we may find 
instruments that are similarly formally constitutive in one or more of various senses; 
whether with reference to their norm-generative or foundational quality, their 
assertion of entrenched status, their precedence over other system norms, or their 
claim to provide an encompassing framework for and measure of the limits of the 
‘body politic’ that they create or recognize.19 And even where such generative, 
entrenched, trumping, embracing and delimiting features of a legal and institutional 
order are independent of a self-styled documentary Constitution, or indeed of a 
single and unrivalled constitutive instrument of any sort, as we have seen in the case 
of  the advocates of WTO constitutionalism,20 or of the constitutionalization of the 
international order,21 or of the various ‘civic’ or ‘societal’ constitutions such as the lex 
mercatoria of the international economy or the lex digitalis of the Internet,22 the mere 
emergence of some combination of these formal features may still be enough for the 
juridical initiative in question to be deemed constitutional in kind. 
A third form of constitutionalism beyond the state, and the one to which  the 
approach sponsored under multilevel constitutionalism senso stricto is closest in 
                                                        
18  Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe; OJ 2004, C310 
19  For a concise statement of the formalist position, see A Stone Sweet, “Constitutionalism, Legal 
Pluralism and International Regimes” (2009) Indiana Jnl. Of Global Legal Studies (forthcoming). 
20  See e.g. D. Cass, The Constitutionalization of the World Trade Organization (Oxford: OUP, 2005); 
E-U Petermann, “The WTO Constitution and Human Rights” (2000) 3 Journal of International 
Economic Law 19. 
21  See e.g.  E de Wet, “The International Constitutional Order”, (2006) International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly. 55, 51-76; for an approach which, unusually, seeks to locate the 
constitutionalization of the international order in documentary terms – in the form of the UN 
Charter, see B. Fassbender, B.  ‘The United Nations Charter as the Constitution of the International 
Community’, (1998) 36 Columbia Journal of International Law, 529. 
22  See e.g. G. Teubner, “Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred Constitutional 
Theory?” in C. Joerges, I-J Sand and G. Teubner (eds) Transnational Governance and 
Constitutionalism (Oxford: Hart, 2004) 3-28; G. Teubner and A.  Fischer-Lescano, “Regime-
Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, (2004) 25(4) 
Michigan Journal of International Law, 999. 
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conception,23 concentrates not on formal matters but on the manifestation of a family 
resemblance between certain substantive features of state constitutionalism and the 
new transnational legal outgrowth. Aspects of  transnational law are deemed to be 
constitutional not, or not only,  because they appear on the commentator’s approved 
list, as with nominalism, but because the mechanisms or concepts in question – from 
general structural formulae such as separation of powers and institutional balance to 
more specific principles such as subsidiarity or proportionality, were long ago 
nurtured in the state constitutional context and, indeed, have often been self-
consciously received into transnational law from these state sources.24  As is the case 
with formalism, however, the connection between the non-state version and the state 
original from the substantivist perspective is a tenuous one. It is dependent upon 
analogy, and in some cases conscious imitation. How deep the analogy runs and 
what is lost - or gained - in translation from one context to another is rarely the 
subject of sustained analysis.25 
If we turn, now, to those who would oppose the movement of constitutionalism 
beyond the state and reject any prospect of multilevel constitutionalism senso lato, 
again they range from the primitive to the more sophisticated. Most basically, and  
more commonly within everyday ‘object’ discourse than in academic ‘observer’ 
discourse, there is a position that holds that the category of constitution is necessarily 
restricted to the state. That position is the negative image of nominalism, and just as 
impervious to counter-suggestion. Whereas nominalism holds to or more often 
simply assumes the solipsistic idea that all meaning is constructed without extra-
linguistic check or constraint, essentialism  holds to or more often simply assumes the 
opposite. It maintains that meaning is fixed and invariable in its correspondence with 
                                                        
23 We should be careful not to overstate this. While this is certainly where much of its practical 
emphasis lies,  multi-level constitutionalism senso stricto,  as set out in the work of Pernice (n7 
above),  is by no means only concerned  with the incidence and development of substantive 
constitutional norms beyond the state. It is, in addition, concerned with the variety of formal 
centres of legal authority, and indeed with the ‘federal’ co-existence of different levels of political 
community and identity (n9 above).  
24  On the migration of particular constitutional concepts from national to transnational level, see 
N. Walker, “The Migration of Constitutional Idea and the Migration of the Constitutional Idea”  in 
S. Choudhry (ed)  The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: CUP, 2006) 316-344. 
25  For one attempt, see N. Walker, “Postnational Constitutionalism and the Problem of 
Translation” in J. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.) European Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2003) 27-54. 
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some extra-linguistic reality, and so it follows that it is simply meaningless to conceive 
of constitutionalism beyond the fixed and invariable limits of the state. 
Beyond essentialism, there are at least two positions - or rather a continuum of 
possibilities framed by two positions - that treat the idea of the constitution as deeply 
embedded in the state. One position is culturalist in nature. It holds the idea of a 
constitution to be hollow, or at least deficient, in the absence of certain attributes, 
including the idea of a democratically self-constituting and self-constituted ‘people’ 
possessing comprehensive powers of self-determination and self-legislation. These 
attributes, it is claimed, are ultimately contingent upon certain prior or emergent 
socio-cultural facts concerning identity, solidarity and allegiance, absent which any 
self-styled constitutional project is fated to be either a dead letter or a much more 
modest affair. Since only the modern state has known such a socio-cultural 
formation, and since even if the modern state is no longer so robust in these terms it 
still constitutes a standing impediment to the development of similar cultural 
formations at non-state sites, there can be no real prospect of a full constitutionalism 
beyond the state.26 
A second position runs even deeper than the culturalist argument without 
succumbing to the semantic sting of state-centred essentialism. This approach we 
may call epistemic in that it focuses on the very idea of the modern state and of the 
political imaginary associated with the idea of the modern state as embracing “a 
scheme of intelligibility… a comprehensive way of seeing, understanding and acting 
in the world”27 that is prior to and prerequisite to a full, modern articulation of the 
idea of constitution. The key insight here, and what distinguishes it from the 
culturalist position, is that the concept of the modern state, understood as a 
particular type of relationship between territory, ruling authority and people, is not 
merely the expression and fruit of a prior cultural achievement – an accomplishment 
of national solidarity that supplies the “battery of power”28 necessary to run the 
                                                        
26 See e.g. D. Grimm, “The Constitution in the Process of Denationalization”, (2005) 12 
Constellations 447. 
27  Se M. Loughlin,  “In Defence of Staatslehre” (2009) 48  Der Staat 1-28. 
28  M. Canovan, Nationhood and Political Theory (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 1996) 80. 
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constitutional machine effectively. More than that, it is a political way of knowing 
and way of being in the absence of whose emergence the very idea of a constitutional 
polity is simply unimaginable. In both cases – culturalist and epistemic -  the 
message is strongly conveyed that the  modern idea and practice of constitutionalism 
could not have developed except in the context and through the container of the 
state, and while this does not, as matter of logical necessity, rule out the possibility of 
a similar constitutionalism emerging in multiple contexts and through a  container 
other than the state, it certainly stacks the odds against such a development and 
places a heavy burden on the defenders of post-state constitutionalism to explain just 
how this is possible. 
 
4. Constitutionalism and Meta-Politics 
This brief examination of nominalist, formalist and substantivist positions on the one 
side of the issue and of essentialist, culturalist and epistemic approaches on the other 
side of the issue underlines the difficulty in finding common cause in the debate 
about multilevel constitutionalism senso lato. How, if at all, do we move beyond this 
divide? Such a possibility would seem to depend upon trying to ascertain what is 
most basically at stake – more basically than is revealed in the various debate-closing 
applications of constitutional language - in the various positions, and upon locating 
some overlapping ground at this more basic level. Clearly, the extreme positions of 
nominalism and essentialism are distinguished on the one hand by blindness to any 
argument that would give any special title to the state and on the other by blindness 
to any trace of constitutionalism beyond the state. The assumptions and arguments 
behind this opposition only begin to be made articulate in the other, more moderate 
positions. On the one hand, the formalist and the substantivists suggest that 
something of value may be retained and adapted from the state tradition when we 
relocate to post-state contexts.  In the case of formalism, the key to translation, so to 
speak, is abstraction, whereas in the case of substantivism, the key is disaggregation. 
In the former case, the very idea of a cohesive legal and institutional order is seen as 
Neil Walker 
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the basis of certain constitutional virtues in new contexts as much as in old, whereas 
in the latter, it is implied that one can pick some features out of the state 
constitutional mix, such as a Charter of Rights or a system of inter-institutional 
checks and balances, and these features will remain of significant value despite being 
deprived of either the fuller legal framework or the deeper socio-cultural context of 
the state. The culturalist and epistemic arguments, on the other hand, see the same 
glass as half-empty rather than half-full. For them, the new is an inadequate pastiche 
of the old rather than a contextually appropriate adaptation. The post-state 
constitution is a machine that, in the culturalist critique, is deprived of the crude 
social energy to power itself sufficiently or, in the epistemic critique, lacks the 
intelligent background software necessary to understand and activate its own 
operating procedures.  
In the final analysis, if we are to overcome this opposition we must look beyond the 
reductive commitments and self-vindicating judgments of even the more thoughtful 
of the state-centred and multilevel positions. We must ask whether there is 
something more general at issue that is capable of being acknowledged within both 
mind-sets, and which can therefore serve as a common point from which to 
investigate their differences. What we need in methodological terms, therefore, is a 
way of treating constitutionalism that is alert to this possibility; a split perspective 
capable of identifying common ground at one level while at another level continuing 
to acknowledge difference in terms of that common ground.  Such a split perspective 
can be supplied, it is submitted, by recasting the debate in functional terms; no 
longer as a one-dimensional contest over diverse and rival conceptions of the ends of 
constitutionalism  understood as ends that either are or are not exclusively associated 
with the state, but as a debate over diverse and rival conceptions of the constitutional  
means necessary to ends that would themselves be capable of commanding general 
agreement across state-centred and multilevel positions. 
But in order to be genuinely inclusive and not simply to impose an artificial 
consensus, any such definition of ends must proceed at a very high level of 
abstraction. At this rarefied level, what implicitly unites the two mind-sets is a sense, 
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corroborated both by the etymology of the constitutional idea and by its range of 
applications prior to the age of the modern state, that constitutionalism serves a deep 
and abiding function in human affairs, namely the meta-political function of shaping 
the domain of politics broadly conceived – of literally ‘constituting’ the body politic.29 
More expansively, constitutionalism in this deepest meta-political sense may be 
understood as referring to that species of practical reasoning which, in the name of some 
defensible locus of common interest, concerns itself with the organization and regulation of 
those spheres of collective decision-making deemed relevant to the common interest in a 
manner that is adequately informed by the common interest.  Furthermore,  if we are to 
avoid simply repeating the familiar definitional impasse at this more general level, 
our meta-political sense of the  ‘common interest’ underpinning our collective 
decision-making capacities as understood in each of its three key registers - 
authoritative (in whose name?), jurisdictional (covering which collective decision-
making capacities?) and purposive (to what end, and how?) – must, in addition, be 
acknowledged as possessing an open, and indeed a reflexive quality.  We cannot, 
therefore, either stipulate in advance or treat as permanently resolved what are the 
appropriate sites for the pursuit of the common interest, or what are the appropriate 
terms of engagement between these sites, or what kinds of things fall within the 
remit of the common interest, or what is the proper relationship between individual 
and collective goods or preferences in the identification and pursuit of the common 
interest. All of these are matters themselves apt for decision in accordance with the 
common interest, understood as located at the very deepest level of political self-
understanding and self-inquiry, and so as necessarily possessing a self-challenging 
and self-amending quality. Accordingly, if, as I suggest, we equate constitutionalism 
with the deepest sense of meta-political inquiry, we cannot simply decide a priori to 
equate the common interest with the national or state interest, and so corroborate an 
initial theoretical preference for state constitutionalism. Equally, we cannot simply 
assume that post-state sites are as appropriate as are states as authoritative sources of 
the common interest, as jurisdictional containers of the common interest, or as 
                                                        
29  See e.g. G. Maddox; ‘A Note on the Meaning of ‘Constitution’’ (1982) 76 The American Political 
Science Review 805-809. See also N. Walker, “Taking Constitutionalism beyond the State (2008) 
56 Political Studies 519. 
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forums and institutional mechanisms for the specification of the common interest, 
and thus simply wish away the state legacy in favour of a multilevel perspective.   
Instead, in order to advance the inquiry and find a point of contentious engagement 
between the two mind-sets, we must turn to second level of inquiry – to the question 
of adequacy of means. If the common interest conceived of as the ultimate end of the 
constitutional project sounds at a level of abstraction – and of perpetual contest-
ability – that does not necessarily or even presumptively discriminate between state 
and post-state sites, is there something about the appropriateness of the means that 
nevertheless pulls in one direction than another? Is there something about the 
constitutional method available in and supported by the state context that is more 
adequate to the pursuit of the common interest than is any constitutional method 
available in and supported by post-state contexts?30 To answer that question we must 
first ask what, if anything, is distinctive to the constitutional method that has been 
available in and supported by the state. Then we must inquire whether that method, 
or any constitutional method or combination of methods that is the instrumental 
equivalent of the state constitutional method, may also be available or be made 
available in multiple sites beyond the state. 
 
5. Holistic Constitutionalism  
There is indeed a constitutional method distinctive to the modern state, and it is best 
understood as possessing a holistic quality. In a nutshell, the holistic method is a 
method of constitutional articulation and engagement in which the authority and 
meaning of the various parts are understood and treated as dependent on the 
integrity of the whole.31  As we shall see, this holistic feature is no isolated thread, but 
                                                        
30  Note that this challenge, as well as querying the force of the formalist and substantivist 
arguments in favour of post-state constitutionalism, also brings back in many of the concerns of 
the culturalist and epistemic critics of post-state constitutionalism. However, it does so in terms 
that, by more clearly specifying the distinction between (state) means and (constitutional) ends, 
are less at risk of reducing the connection between state and constitution to a tautology.    
31  See more generally, N. Walker, “Out of Time and Out of Place: Law’s Fading Co-ordinates” 
(2009) 13 Edinburgh Law Review (forthcoming). For an insightful but  rather different treatment 
Multilevel Constitutionalism 
 
16 
something that gives texture to the various different aspects of state consti-
tutionalism. 
To appreciate this, however, we must first say something more about the 
constitutional concept itself. In so doing, we are no longer concerned, as in the 
previous section, with constitutionalism in the abstract – as a  theoretical concept for 
making sense of and evaluating the social world, but with constitutionalism in the 
concrete – as an ‘object’ already at use ‘in’ the social world, and in the social world of 
the state in particular. Considered as such an ‘object’ concept, state constitutionalism 
can be viewed both diachronically and synchronically. Diachronically, state 
constitutionalism in the modern age describes a particular high point of accu-
mulation of various distinct layers of situated ‘constitutional’  practice that have 
operated separately or in different combinations in the past. These layers are 
juridical, politico-institutional, popular and societal.32Synchronically, state 
constitutionalism operates in terms of its own particular formulation of these layers 
and of their relationship with one another. Constitutionalism in (state) practice 
behaves, in other words, as a “cluster concept”33, associated simultaneously with a 
number of different but themselves interrelated definitive criteria.   
It is in  each of its four layers – or, if you like, in different parts of the cluster - that we 
can observe constitutionalism operating holistically, offering an encompassing frame 
for the ‘constitutive’ representation34 and regulation of each of the particular 
dimensions of social ‘reality’ with which it is concerned. What is more, in the 
constellation of connections made under the sign of modern state constitutionalism 
between each of these layers we can also discern a further ‘frame of frames,’ or 
                                                                                                                                                               
of holism, treated not as  the basic organizing method of modern political life, as in the present 
case, but  as a descriptor of the key ontological unit  in the ordering of  political society (and so 
considered as equivalent to a fundamentally pre-modern idea of indivisible community, and 
contrasted with modern individualism),  see A. von  Bogdandy and S. Dellavalle “Universalism  
Renewed:  Habermas’  Theory  of  International  Order  in  Light  of  Competing Paradigms”(2009) 
10 German Law Journal (January) 5-30.   
32  See Walker, n29 above; and with specific reference to the EU, N. Walker ‘European 
Constitutionalism in the State Constitutional Tradition’ in J. Holder, C.O’Cinneide and C. Campbell-
Holt (eds) Current Legal Problems 2006 59, 51-89. 
33  W. E. Connolly, The Terms of Political Discourse (Oxford: Blackwell, 3rd ed., 1993) 14. 
34  On the ways in which acts of  representation of a legal object are routinely (re) constitutive of 
that legal object, see e.g. H. Lindahl,  Sovereignty and Representation in the European Union  in N. 
Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford: Hat, 2003)   87-114  
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‘holism of holisms’. Let us look more closely at each of the holistic frames of state 
constitutionalism separately, and then in combination. 
 To begin with, the juridical frame refers to an idea of self-contained legal order, 
complete with rules of self-production, self-organisation, self-extension, self-
interpretation, self-amendment and self-discipline, all of which combine to affirm the 
autonomous existence and comprehensive authority of the legal order against other 
internal and external normative forces. The politico-institutional frame refers to a 
system of institutional specification and differentiation of the sphere of the   public 
and the political. Whereas the idea of autonomous legal order long predates 
modernity and the modern state, the idea of a secular, specialized and institutionally 
defined and delimited political realm, free from deference to particular interests or to 
any idea of transcendental order, is a key emergent feature of modernity. It is 
marked by a double move away from pre-modern forms of authority, involving both 
the drawing of a general distinction between public and private spheres of influence 
domains and the integration of the public into a single and comprehensive political 
domain. What is more, the creation and sustenance of this singular political domain, 
and indeed the consolidation of the autonomous legal order, is dependent upon “the 
structural coupling”35 and mutual support of the two self-contained spheres of the 
legal and the political. 
For its part, the popular frame refers to the dimension of ‘we the people’, and so to 
the idea of the specialized and integrated public institutional realm being 
underpinned not just by the autonomy of the political but also by its democratic self-
constitution and self-authorship. The societal frame, finally, refers to the idea that the 
constitution pertains to a particular ‘society’ self-understood and self-identified as 
such. Here the framing work of the constitution is mostly symbolic rather than 
normative. The Constitution depends for its normative effectiveness as a design for a  
reasonably cooperative and commonly committed form of  common living  on the 
plausibility of the very idea of an integrated society – whether the emphasis is on the 
thin  ‘political society’ of the state or the thicker ‘cultural society’ of the nation – that 
                                                        
35 N. Luhmann  Das Recht der Gesellschaft, (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1993). 
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its very production and perseverance  as  a Constitution  seeks to announce and 
promote. 
If we look more closely at the points of interconnection between the various frames 
we can see begin to appreciate how a broader ‘holism of constitutional holisms’ 
emerges under the template of the modern state. At the juridical and politico-
institutional levels, the constitutional order (sometimes in conjunction with self-
styled ‘organic  laws’) typically place a mix of structural (politico-institutional level) 
and substantive (juridical level) requirements on public actors, which may be either 
specific functional institutions (e.g. industry-specific regulators) or generic 
government organs – Parliament, Executive, and Judiciary. The structural 
requirements are both internal and external. They are concerned with the internal 
governance system of the institution in question – decision-making procedures, 
representational rules, internal review and accountability rules etc, as well as with 
the situation of the institution in question within a wider institutional complex – 
including all the classic checks we associate with ideas of horizontal separation of 
powers, of federated vertical division of authorities, and of institutional balance 
more generally. The substantive requirements include, in positive and constitutive 
vein, jurisdiction or mandate rules which specify the public purposes of the 
institutions in question and the boundaries of these purposes, as well as, in negative 
vein, certain conduct-constraining rules that may take the form of general individual 
rights catalogues or other more detailed rules which are likewise concerned with 
trans-sectoral standards (e.g. freedom of information rules, anti-corruption rules.) 
A number of points may be made about the co-articulation of these different types of 
rules. First, there is the dependence of the substantive rules on the structural rules. 
The structural rules provide a general framework of orientation, co-ordination and 
sanction that undergird the norm-specific guidelines contained in the substantive 
rules. Secondly, given their various boundary-setting and transversal qualities, the 
substantive rules associated with a particular constitutionally recognized function 
presuppose and are themselves supported and rendered more effective by their 
situation in a legal order that ranges more broadly than the particular functional 
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specialism in question. That broader framework  constrains and informs  both by 
locating issues of  the vires of particular institutions in a wider context of empowered 
institutions and by bringing  general standards of the ‘right’ to bear in qualifying the 
pursuit of the particular ‘good’. Thirdly, the content of both the substantive and the  
structural rules  is inscribed in a basic constitutional code that is relatively insulated 
from the particular institutions that are subject to these very substantive and 
structural rules. In particular, the combination of the autonomous rules of pro-
duction of constitutional norms and their settled quality (perhaps entrenched in 
‘eternity’ clauses or protected against simple majoritarian amendment rules, or at 
least subject to amendment provisions not within the gift of the affected institution 
itself), provides a form of protection against narrow forms of self-norming. Fourthly, 
the constitutional code is not only insulated from particular interests, but, more 
positively, it is receptive at points of origin, amendment and continuing inter-
pretation to notions of common interest informed, one the one hand, by the idea of 
the constitution as a form of popular self-authorization over the totality of public 
affairs for a territory, and on the other, by the necessary discipline of ensuring 
widespread cooperation and compliance within the ambient society.     
In summary, this combination of structural primacy, institution-transcending 
substantive rules, insulation of rules of constitutional norm production and 
maintenance from control by the institutions affected by these norms, and the 
openness of the same rules to broader forms of public influence and discipline, 
provides the key ingredients of a holistic method of constitutionalism.  The parts are 
supported by the whole both within and across the various different frames. 
Particular sector-specific rules and institutions alike depend for their meaning and 
authority on their location within broader regulatory and institutional orders, which 
broader orders are informed by a similarly wide-reaching and holistic conception of 
the singular public as both the source and the receptive environment of 
constitutional authority. 
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6. Constitutionalism Beyond the State: Multilevel or Multi-
actor?  
If we look to levels and sites of authority beyond the state, what scope is there for the 
application of the holistic constitutional method? And where it is not available, how 
else, if at all, might constitutionalism’s deep meta-political concern with the source, 
extent and manner of pursuit of matters of common interest be met? 
Clearly, some forms of post-state regimes or polities seem to fit quite well on the 
‘scale’ of constitutionalism considered as a layered set of holistic frames. The recent 
debate about the adoption of a documentary Constitution for the EU, to return to the 
best known and most mature example of a multilevel constitutional pattern, 
eventually crystallized as one about how an entity whose ‘thin’ credentials as a self-
standing juridical and politico-institutional order are unarguable36 might also be re-
imagined and reconstructed in ‘thick’ terms as a popular and indeed ‘political-
societal’ constitution – one with its own democratically sensitive self-constituting 
authority and its ‘own’ transnational society as an object of reference.37 The EU, in 
other words, clearly already possessed holistic constitutional qualities in certain 
layers, and the outstanding question concerned whether this could be extended 
across all the layers of modern constitutional practice. Once the supporters of the 
project were no longer satisfied with the documentary constitutional process as an 
exercise in self-congratulatory consolidation of its ‘thin’ (juridical and politico-
institutional) credentials, or at least once they were no longer permitted by their 
opponents to treat the question so complacently, the ‘thin’ versus ‘thick’ question 
came more clearly into focus in the constitutional debate. That this ultimately led to 
the idea of a European Constitutional Treaty being voted down in the key French 
and Dutch referenda in 2005 neither undermines the relevance of the wide discussion 
nor, indeed, precludes its being revisited at some future point. 38 
                                                        
36 See e.g. J. H. H. Weiler, The Constitution of Europe (Cambridge: CUP, 1999) ch.1.  
37  See e.g. Walker, n32 above.  
38  See e.g. N. Walker, “Not the European Constitution” (2008) 15   Maastricht Jnl. Of European and 
Comparative Law 115; R. Dehousse, La Fin de L’Europe (Paris: Flammarion); P. Magnette, Au Nom 
de Peuples:Le malentendu constitutionnel européen (Brussels : CERF) 
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In other cases such as the WTO or the UN, the  debate over the nature and limits of 
constitutional holism is very much more confined to the ‘thin’ legal and politico-
institutional registers, with no pretence of and little ambition towards a popular 
constituent power or dedicated ’society’ at the relevant sites.39 Even here, however, 
there is no doubt about the applicability of a holistic method, even if to a truncated 
conception of constitutionalism. Indeed, it is precisely the well-established quality of 
a modest constitutional holism in these more limited regimes as much as in the 
hybrid regime of the EU that feeds much of the argument for post-state consti-
tutionalism within a multilevel constellation, with the formalist approach trading on 
the holistic quality of the juridical layer and the substantivist approach trading on 
the holistic quality of the institutional layer.   
Another type of case, however, stands more clearly detached from the tradition of 
state constitutionalism. Here we refer to the various other autonomy-assertive trans-
national societal actors exhibiting normative authority and institutional identity who 
increasingly claim or are deemed to possess constitutional standing,40 whether in the 
field of internet (e.g. ICANN) or transnational commercial regulation (e.g. Lex 
Mercatoria) or the regulation of sports (e.g. International Olympic Committee, World 
Anti-Doping Agency). In this context, we find a much more comprehensive move 
away from the holistic method, and so an even starker confrontation of the question 
of whether and how the broader meta-political end of regulating our common affairs 
in accordance with considerations of the common interest can survive the erosion of 
the state-originated holistic constitutional method.  Here, too, we begin to strain 
against the limits of the ‘multilevel’ metaphor itself. If the language of levels suggests 
a constellation of stable, relatively self-contained and reasonably ‘state-like’ sites or 
platforms, the introduction of non-holistically embedded transnational societal 
agents suggests instead a network of fluid, intermeshing nodes of influence. And 
insofar as the constitutional language remains at all appropriate – a question to 
which we return in the final section below- the transnational domain is perhaps more 
                                                        
39  See references at ns 20 and 21  above. 
40   See e.g. Teubner, n 22 above. 
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aptly conceived of as a “multi-actor constitutionalism”41 rather than as a multilevel 
configuration.  
But in what precise sense do the new transnational societal actors represent a move 
away from the holistic method?  If we look first to the juridical and political-
institutional layers, the idea of holistic self-containment fits ill with the combination 
of site-specific self-regulation and diverse external regulation we tend to find in these 
sectors. While there is typically a dense network of structural and substantive rules, 
we will not find the same holistic framework for their co-articulation. Internally, 
structural rules may be found in autonomous enterprise or organizational laws. 
Externally, different legislative, executive and judicial bodies at national, inter-
national and supranational, level will stand in various structural relationships with 
the actors. Substantively, again we will find the same complex mixture of self-
regulation and uncoordinated external regulation, through for example, horizontal 
application of human rights rules and the general regimes of international standards 
bodies (e.g. Codex Alimentarius, International Standards Organization). What is 
lacking in either case is any idea of an integrated and comprehensive legal and 
institutional design external to the sector in question.  
Equally, the idea of the holistic self-constitution of a popular ‘subject’ or of a societal 
‘object’ does not translate easily to the domain of the new transnational societal 
actors. In either case – popular and societal – the wider and deeper embeddedness 
associated with state constitutionalism is lost insofar as there is no sense of an 
integrated and generic ‘public’ context which stands beyond the special institution in 
question but within which the special institution is fully incorporated. So there may 
be a significant degree of domain-specific self-authorship, but it neither is identical to 
nor delegated from any more integrated and generic public. Equally, there may be 
constituted a ‘society’ in the sense of a particular epistemic community and/or 
                                                        
41  This is a less common term, but see e.g. National Research Council Global Netwoks and Local 
Values (Washington: Computer Science and Telecommunication Board, USA, 2002) ch.8. 
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community of practice associated with the domain in question, but that too is neither 
identical to nor a subset of any integrated and generic  ‘public society’.42  
It follows from this that none of the connecting elements – the ‘holism of holisms’ – 
of state constitutionalism can be guaranteed. In the first place, given the diversity of 
their pedigree (both as separate sets, and, even more so, when considered together), 
the relationship between the set of structural rules and the set of substantive rules 
lacks the coherence of the state model. So the structural rules cannot provide the 
functions of orientation, co-ordination and constraint vis-à-vis the substantive rules 
in the ‘close fit’ manner that characterizes their relationship within the holistic state 
constitution. Secondly, there is no commonly bound general constitutional context to 
provide the transversal controls upon and wider jurisdictional context for sector-
specific substantive rules. Because the transnational societal actor is not located 
within a wider complex of international societal actors, each subject to the same 
transversal rules and the same broader jurisdictional frame, the kinds of constraint 
and direction that a state constitution can provide by ensuring common negative 
standards and providing for the mutual co-ordination of different jurisdictional 
horizons cannot apply in the same way. Finally, the absence of any broader, singular 
and autonomously-conceived transnational constitutional frame as an appropriate 
point of common reference both reflects and highlights  the absence of any integrated 
and generic sense of the transnational public as the subject and object of any such 
regulatory field.43 
 
 
                                                        
42 We should, of course, bear in mind Teubner’s qualification that the ‘society’ of the state 
constitutional imaginary was always in an important sense a partial vision (n. 22 above). It was 
first and foremost a ‘political society’ – it was about the mutual self-constitution of law and 
politics and not necessarily concerned with other social sectors or sub-systems (economics, 
culture etc).  But even if we allow this important point of social epistemology, we still have to 
take seriously the distinctively ‘totalizing’ ambition contained in the claim of modern political 
society to constitute a generic and integrated public sphere, and also recognize the powerful 
historical synergy between this ambition and the development of a deeper ‘cultural’ nationalism. 
43  On the effect of the decline of holistic constitutionalism on the overall global regulatory field, 
rather than on the pattern of regulation within particular sectors, see N. Walker “Beyond 
Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping the Global Disorder of Normative Orders” (2008) 6 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 373-396.  
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7. Beyond Constitutionalism? 
So the new transnational societal constitutionalism, such as it is, is clearly not simply 
the occurrence of a more ‘thinly’ layered version of state constitutionalism at other 
levels  with the thicker popular and societal frame absent - as in the EU and in other 
less well-developed cases - but a constitutionalism that is reconfigured in each of its 
framing aspects. The idea of a holistic constitution is lacking in each of the four 
registers. What we have instead is a complex mix of discrete self-constitution and 
diffuse external constitution across all four registers – legal, politico-institutional, 
popular and societal. 44  
To what extent, if at all, can we nevertheless conceive of this new non-holistic consti-
tutional method as  concerned with, and as effectively  engaged in,  the same  meta-
political function as holistic state constitutionalism; namely, the reflexive consi-
deration of the proper locus, jurisdiction and content of the common interest in 
matters concerning the organization and regulation of collective decision-making? 
On the face of it, absent the anchorage for a working conception of the common 
interest provided by the coincidence of at least some if not all of the four holistic 
frames in a single ‘level’ under the same territorial co-ordinates, any prospect of a 
meaningful investment in these meta-political questions of the common interest 
would seem distinctly unpromising.  Yet, for at least three reasons, we should remain 
slow to dismiss the possibility of a non-holistic constitutionalism beyond the state. 
                                                        
44 We should also distinguish non-holistic societal constitutionalism from the kind of post-
national constitutionalism favored by writers like Jim Tully. For him and others, the main focus of 
criticism remains the state form, not from the perspective of a functional differentiation which 
makes the holistic state constitution inadequate to the range and distribution of collective 
practices but rather from the perspective of a cultural differentiation (first nations, gendered 
identities etc) which makes the holistic state constitution inadequate to the range and 
distribution of collective identities. His version of non-state  constitutionalism, accordingly,  is 
about the re-articulation of a much greater diversity of holistic identities than the state form 
allows rather than the transcendence of the very  idea of holistic constitutionalism, although, as 
explained in the text below, and as Tully would  endorse, any such generously and diversely 
populated  constitutional landscape implies, distinct from the classic (inter) state version,   the 
non-comprehensiveness of each holistic structure and the much greater zone of overlap between 
each  holistic structure, and so the greater scope and need for (non-holistic) legal  relations 
between these holistic structures. See e.g. J. Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism in an Age 
of Diversity (Cambridge: CUP, 1995); “The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy” in 
M. Loughlin and N. Walker (eds) The Paradox of Constitutionalism: Constituent Power and 
Constitutional Form.  (Oxford: OUP, 2007) 315-338. 
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In the first place, there is the question of the viability of other possible constitutional 
worlds. What are the alternatives, and so what can and what should we compare the 
new non-holistic candidates for constitutional status with? The most telling compa-
rator for current trends towards decisively non-holistic forms of constitutionalism is 
not, as often seems to be assumed by the advocates of state constitutionalism, the past 
of state constitutionalism, but the form and circumstances of its present incarnation. 
The high-point of the holistic state constitutional method is long gone. In 
acknowledging this, we must also appreciate that much of  what is new in 
transnational regulatory development, whether  in the form of hybrid structures 
such as the EU or WTO or through the more radical forms of societal constitu-
tionalism, is the result not of  inadvertent drift or of so many grabs for power devoid 
of any public justification, but instead is in some part at least  a response to the 
growing inadequacy of the holistic state model in the face of the emergence of 
collective action and co-ordination problems that simply do not coincide with the 
political boundaries of the state. The new world even of the familiar and deeply 
embedded category of state constitutionalism, it follows, is not the same as the old. 
The new state constitutionalism may remain holistic in the sense that in each of the 
four framing registers it continues to emphasize the importance of the integrity of the 
whole and the interdependence of its parts, but this holism is qualified to the extent 
that it can no longer aspire to an all-embracing quality. Rather, state consti-
tutionalism itself becomes an ‘open’ or’ relational’ constitutionalism,45 concerned to 
engage in accordance with a necessarily non-holistic logic with the very hybrid 
polities and non-holistic spheres of governance that have been the focus of our 
attention, and with which the norms, institutions, demoi and societal ‘objects’ of the 
state constitutional order overlap. In short, by their emergence the non-holistic 
constitutional forms serve to indicate, and through their regulatory penetration they 
serve to reinforce the inadequacy of the very model of holistic state constitutionalism 
with which, ironically enough, they are often unfavourably compared. And to the 
extent that there remains a point of comparison between old and  new constitutional 
constellations, it is a matter of more or less emphasis upon a now heavily qualified 
                                                        
45 See e.g.  Walker, n25 above.  
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state constitutional holism rather than a stark either/or choice between holism and its 
opposite. 
In the second place, there is the question of (meta-) political morality and prudence. 
Such important differences of emphasis as do remain between more or less holistic 
venues, and the choices associated with these, are not necessarily beyond evaluation 
in terms that we find constitutionally meaningful. Rather, we remain capable of 
articulating at least some elements of the common language that would allow us to 
assess the relative merits and demerits of the holistic and non-holistic approaches to 
meta-politics, and to do in such a way that suggests that the more holistic solution is 
not always the better or more ‘constitutionally’ appropriate. 
Holistic constitutionalism, even in qualified form, can lay claim to many political 
virtues; to the formal  equality and calculability dividends that may accrue to a legal 
order with a single all-embracing centre; to reliable juridical transmission of the  
(democratically formed) political will; to co-ordinated and mutually vigilant forms of 
institutional balance; to popular collective self-determination, and to a sense of 
societal solidarity necessary to make that collective self-determination effective. But 
such a model also demonstrates instability at either edge of its precarious 
accomplishment. On the one side, just because of its all-embracing reach and its 
exhaustion of the available mechanism of political influence and restraint, holistic 
constitutionalism is peculiarly prone to capture by powerful special interests and 
ideologies in any or all of its framing registers. On the other side, the same 
propensity to stretch across and absorb the entirety of the political sphere may mean 
that holistic constitutionalism attracts certain disabling tendencies, including a 
tendency towards inter-institutional stasis and gridlock and towards a thinly spread 
culture of common commitment. That is to say, comprehensive self-containment of 
the political sphere may always have been the major strength of holistic 
constitutionalism, but it also speaks to its irreducible vulnerability and ineradicable 
sources of danger. 
This double-edged concern illustrates and so points us towards certain perennial 
preoccupations over the best mode of accommodation between  certain contrasting 
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but balancing virtues associated with the identification and pursuit  of the common 
interest in constitutional arrangements  -  between attachment and detachment, the 
special and the general, the particular and the universal, the passionate and the 
constraining. Holism in the container of the state seeks ever more regulatory distance 
and abstraction (in substance, in structure and in pedigree) and ever more 
investment in a broader scheme of political commitments as a guide to and means of 
avoiding concentration of power in particular institutions, all the while courting the 
opposite dangers of more expansive forms of political partiality or the dilution of the 
capacity for the effective mobilization of political authority.   
These moral and prudential concerns are not foreign to the new non-holistic 
constitutionalism of transnational societal actors. Rather, it is simply the case that its 
institutional logic is such that these concerns present themselves in inverse form. The 
problem for non-holistic constitutionalism is neither the corruption and capture nor 
the impotence of the regulatory whole, but precisely the same dangers of over-
steering and under-steering under the opposite condition of the absence of any such 
regulatory whole. And the key design puzzle in addressing these dangers of over-
steering and under-steering concerns the appropriate mode of articulation of the 
internal and external elements within the legal and politico-institutional structure (in 
the first two framing layers), bearing in mind the fundamental irreducibility of the 
‘constituency’ and ‘own society’ of the relevant community of practice to some 
integrated and generic notion of the public (in the third and fourth framing layers). It 
is quite understandable, then, that so much of contemporary transnational 
‘constitutional’ thinking is concerned to develop ‘substantive’ and ‘structural’ rules 
in a manner that seeks to compensate or substitute both for the myopically self-
interested tendencies (oversteering) and for the absence of effective leverage over 
external factors of influence (understeering) that accompany the lack of embedding 
of narrow self-regulatory spheres in a wider, holistic constitutional framework. So, 
for example, we find an increasing emphasis on the language of universal human 
rights,46 on the widespread franchising of general regulatory standards,47 and on the 
                                                        
46  See e.g., Petersmann, n 20 above. 
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promulgation and internalization of codes of corporate responsibility48 as ways, 
primarily, of correcting for the sectoral self-interest of particular transnational 
societal actors, but also of encouraging or facilitating the greater mutual coherence of 
their regimes. On the structural side, too, we see a number of trends that have the 
same double purpose and effect of addressing the dangers of oversteering and 
understeering. This can be observed, for instance, in attempts to develop new forms 
of general discipline as well as to trace new ways of joining up connected regulatory 
concerns through initiatives such as the elaboration of general principles of Global 
Administrative Law,49 the replication and refinement of New Modes of Governance50 
and the ‘rolling out’ of local or sector-specific forms of democratic experimentation 
and problem-solving.51    
In all of this, admittedly, the similarities and continuities in the meta-political 
concern with the common interest in the organization and regulation of collective 
decision-making between past and present - and so between more or less holistic 
constitutional forms - operate at a high level of abstraction, require careful 
translation and certainly do not admit of any easy general conclusions. Still, there is 
something resiliently recognizable at stake between old and new understandings of 
these deep questions of regulation which may merit our continued use of 
constitutional language as an analytical and evaluative tool for both. 
This brings us, finally, to a third consideration, namely the practical question of the 
use-value of constitutionalism once it is stretched not only beyond the state but also 
beyond the holistic method, and, arguably too, beyond the limits of appropriate 
deployment of the metaphor of ‘levels’.  It is one thing to contend on the rarefied 
level of theoretical inquiry that we can trace a connection between the old and the 
                                                                                                                                                               
47 See e.g. H. Schepel The Constitution of Private Governance - Product Standards in the Regulation 
of Integrating Markets (Oxford: Hart, 2005). 
48  See e.g. D J McBarnet, “Corporate Social Responsibility: beyond law, through law, for law: the 
new corporate accountability” in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu, T Campbell (eds), The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2007). 
49 See e.g. B. Kingsbury, N. Krisch and R. B. Stewart, “The Emergence of Global Administrative 
Law”, (2005) Law & Contemporary Problems, 68(3), 15-61 
50 See e.g.  G, de Burca and J. Scott (eds), Law and New Governance in the EU and the US (Oxford: 
Hart, 2006)  
51  See e.g. C. F. Sabel and J. Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of 
Experimentalist Governance in the EU” (2008) 14 European Law Journal, 271–327. 
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new, and to remind ourselves that in terms of viable political possibilities the 
difference is no longer one of kind but of degree. If, however, below that rarified 
theoretical level, there is little actual use of constitutionalism as a common 
vernacular  extending across the two contexts, and if what use there is has instead  
the divisive and mutually alienating consequences discussed in our opening section, 
then what is gained by retaining the constitutional idea for the emerging realm of 
transnational societal actors? This note of scepticism is deeply underscored, 
moreover, if we consider the key underlying reason for the scarcity of an inclusive 
use-language of constitutionalism in the post-state, post-holistic regulatory context. 
This has to do with the lack of the additional, inclusively reflexive ‘fifth layer’ of 
constitutionalism within the non-holistic picture, namely the ‘frame of frames’ or 
‘holism or holisms’. Absent the coincidence of the other four frames, not only, as 
already noted, is it objectively the case that constitutionalism is deprived of the single 
anchorage of a convergence of sites and frames of common interest. At the 
intersubjective level, too, participants will lack the common ‘we’ perspective and 
point of commitment from which to address all questions of the common interest. 
Instead, we are bound to accept in a post-holistic context that questions of the 
common interest in collective decision–making are simply not questions that, at the 
deepest level of political self-interrogation, we can envisage all interested 
constituencies affected addressing comprehensively in common.  
Does this not, at last, provide the decisive argument against the value of retaining the 
language of constitutionalism in the non-holistic transnational context?  I would 
contend that it does not. The explicit adoption of constitutional language in non-
holistic settings may remain largely restricted to theoretical and other elite discourse. 
But the trend, however hesitant and uneven,  is towards wider use, and, as the 
example of the intermediate cases of the EU, WTO etc. show, there do exist recent 
precedents for largely theoretical discourses of post-state constitutionalism gradually 
to ‘catch on’ at deeper social and political levels. Much more important is what the 
resilience and resurgence of constitutional language, however patchy on the ground, 
might signify. Even - indeed especially - where, as compared to the holistic 
constitutional tradition, the central issues of non-holistic forms of regulation present 
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themselves in such different ways and are offered a quite distinctive range of 
regulatory solutions, constitutional language retains a crucial longstop function as a 
kind of “placeholder”52 for certain abiding concerns we have. These concerns are, 
quite simply, that unless we can address the meta-political framing of politics in a 
manner that remains wedded to ideas of the common interest, however difficult this 
may be to conceive and however far we have traveled from our most familiar and 
perhaps most conducive framework for such a task, something of great and 
irreplaceable value will have been lost from our resources of common living.  
There is one final irony here. It is precisely because the language of constitutionalism, 
considered as a normative technology, finds it ever more complex and difficult to 
address the problems of communal living it poses in and for a post-state world, that 
it becomes all the more important to retain the language of constitutionalism, 
considered as a symbolic legacy, as an insistent reminder of what and how much is 
at stake. The day that constitutionalism’s inability  -perhaps even an expansively 
conceived  multilevel constitutionalism’s inability - to provide stock answers to its 
abiding questions becomes a  settled reason no longer even to ask these questions is 
the day that constitutionalism’s  historical paradigm will truly have been exhausted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
52  The reference is to Martti Koskenniemi, who has made a similar point about the contemporary 
fate of international law. See M. Koskenniemi n13 above, 30. 
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